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Abstract 
Since the 1960’s Olson-Zeckhauser’s (1966) analysis, and its “exploitation of the great by the 
small” has provided economists’ core model of alliance’s provision of security/defense.  But with the end 
of the Cold War countries allocative behavior has diverged markedly from OZ’s predictions for defense 
as a homogeneous pure public good voluntarily provided. This paper suggests a replacement for OZ, 
with the essential difference that “defense” rather than being aggregated into their single public good is 
disaggregated into more realistic categories of self-insurance and self-protection. Because allocative 
behavior in public good groups is essentially driven by income effects, we concentrate on these, which 
become complex and conflicted, giving much greater scope for goods-inferiority. The analysis is 
followed by numerical simulations, which conform to actual experienced allocations in NATO much 
better than the conventional “exploitation” model.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper extends existing analyses of self-insurance and self-protection that countries may 
implement at a multi-national level in pursuit of their security. This leads us to challenge as inadequate 
the conventional wisdom about how separate countries in an alliance share the economic burden of 
defense --- the Olson Zeckhauser  (OZ) model --- and to propose a better alternative as represented by 
our theory.  This paper shows that a disaggregated self-insurance/self-protection framework can explain 
recent burden sharing better than the one pure public good model of Olson and Zeckhauser. 
Security benefits may spill over becoming public goods among countries (Olson and 
Zeckhauser, 1966) which then interact in their allocations of national incomes to international (or 
regional) safety and welfare. Examples of these public goods include formation of international 
organizations, collective military preparedness, and active international diplomacy which may reduce 
commonly shared probabilities of regional and international tension.  The distinctions of self-insurance, 
self-protection, and market insurance were first made by Ehrlich and Becker (1972). But application of 
their models to international security where market insurance for entire countries is usually unavailable 
remains surprisingly sparse except for some work on terrorism such as Sandler (1992, 1997, and 2005).  
In particular, economists' voluntary public good (VPG) models have not been well extended to 
understand incentives and behaviors of sovereign agents desiring to manage risks along multiple 
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channels analogous to EB's self-protection and self-insurance in a multi-good, multi-country setting. The 
purpose of this paper is to contribute to that extension, by explicitly investigating the effect of loss in the 
bad state. 
With multiple types of pure public goods one should expect, allocative instability and imbalance 
from incentives discovered by Cornes and Itaya (2010).   They demonstrated that when two agents in a 
partnership both could provide two different (pure) public goods, then at a Nash equilibrium, it is 
impossible (unless both agents have identical preference functions) for both agents to share in the 
provision of both goods. Here we develop a realistic formulation that can avoid that Cornes-Itaya 
problem in a multiple public good framework.  However, instead of their problem, we face another one: 
goods inferiority. That is, when insurance is provided as a pure public good by/among nations in an 
allied group, we demonstrate a strong presumption for goods-inferiority.  We show that even if the sign 
of income effect on self protection is positive in a single-country setting, the effect of higher income on 
Nash Equilibria becomes negative in a two-country setting. The cause of this anomaly we denominate as 
a “spillover income effect”. Because of this effect corner solutions are likely to occur with respect to 
provision of self protection. When both self insurance and self protection are inferior, big countries 
should provide much less security spending than small countries, but in reality this is not normally 
observed. We call this seemingly paradoxical outcome the “inferiority difficulty”.  
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To address this difficulty, we also focus on effects of changes in loss-in-the-bad-state. If loss-in-
the-bad-state increases, it should stimulate security spending. If such loss is positively associated with 
income, income growth should stimulate security spending still more – a relationship that we believe 
will in reality better explain security allocations among allies as losses in the bad state often change over 
time.  
Assuming CRRA utility functions, our simulations provide numerical results of income and 
loss-in-the-bad-state and the resulting resource allocations that support our explanatory hypothesis. We 
believe that these numerical examples and the theory supporting them better explain various changes in 
observed security spending of NATO than does the conventional wisdom. 
The conventional wisdom comes from Olson and Zeckhauser (1966). Their theory led to the so-
called exploitation hypothesis, whereby the large, wealthy allies shoulder the defense burdens of an 
entire alliance including all those of their smaller-GDP allies. If defense spending is purely public and 
the income effect is positive, wealthier allies can be expected to contribute more defense than less 
wealthy allies, provided tastes do not differ significantly among allies. Actually, some early studies of 
defense demand found defense to be a normal good during the Cold War, and thus, they confirmed the 
“exploitation hypothesis”.  
However, some studies have argued that the good NATO supplied was not purely public, 
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especially after 1967 and were skeptical about the plausibility of the exploitation hypothesis in 1970s.  
See among others Murdoch and Sandler (1984), Sandler and Forbes (1980), and Sandler and Shimuzu 
(2012). As shown in Table 4.1(a), recent data on military spending after the Cold War do not support the 
OZ ‘exploitation hypothesis.’ There have been many candidates to explain why the exploitation 
hypothesis failed --- non Nash-Cournot allocative behavior, Lindahl behavior, systematic differences in 
recognition or evaluation of the “threat,” inapplicability of a single utility function to represent the 
interests of an entire government or nation etc. Among others, Sandler and Hartley (2001) developed the 
joint product model.1  
The argument of this paper depends on none of the foregoing “candidates.” Nevertheless, from 
calculating the effect of changes in possible loss, our numerical examples offer an alternative 
explanation for historical security allocations. Specifically to explain the reduction in the security 
expenditures of NATO in 1990s pursuant to the fall of the Soviet Union our model show how this would 
follow from a decrease in NATO’s threatened loss-in-the-bad-state. Thus, we present an alternative 
model of a defense alliance which has a richer structure, and which is more satisfactory than that of 
Olson/Zeckhauser (1966). 
This paper consists of five sections. Section 2 formulates a basic analytical framework for two 
allied countries, and derives the optimization conditions. In Section 3, investigating the income effects 
  
6 
on self-insurance and self-protection, the analysis explores how in a two country world an increase in the 
income of one country affects its self-insurance and self-protection through the response of the other 
country. Section 4 presents some numerical results to illustrate security allocations and evaluate the 
plausibility of exploitation hypothesis. Here we show how our insurance/protection framework implies 
behavior close to observed NATO allocations. Finally section 5 concludes. 
 
2. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1 Basic assumptions 
Suppose that the world consists of two countries: A and B. We consider two contingent states of 
the world: a good state "1" and a bad state, "0". Ignoring all insurance and compensation possibilities 
expected utility for country 
 
i(i = A,B)  is given as: 
 
W i = pU1(C1i )+ (1- p)U 0(C0i ),       (1) 
where Wi is country i’s expected utility, C1i is i’s consumption in a good state, C0i is i’s consumption in a 
bad state, and p is the chance of a good state. Although we consider the term "1-p" as the risk of invasion 
or war, it might be the risk of trade interruption, disease outbreak, or natural disaster. Utility function 
U( ) is assumed to be the same whether luck is good or bad.  U1  denotes realized utility if the good event 
happens, and U 0  if the bad event happens, andUY º ¶U / ¶Y > 0,UYY º ¶
2U / ¶Y 2 < 0 . 
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We will focus on the two canonical types of Ehrlich-Becker (EB) defense; (i) EB’s “self-
protection;" which raises the chance of a good state, (ii) EB’s “self-insurance” which reduces the loss in 
a bad state. Countries can provide self-insurance and self-protection mutually, as public goods for each 
other. The individual country’s budget constraint is given as 
C1i =Y i -m1
i -pm2
i ; C0i =Y i -m1
i - Li,      (2) 
where Y i  is the fixed national income of country i, m1
i  represents country i’s allocation to risk 
improving self-protection,  pm2
i  gives the expenditure on self-insurance in good times (measured in 
units of C1i), m2
i  represents the amount of self-insurance purchased by country i at price p , and Li  
gives the loss for country i in a bad state. 
The first risk management instrument to consider is self-protection. Both m1
A  and m1
B  spent on 
self-protection decrease the chance of a bad event, 1-p, from what we call "baseline risk2 of [1-p(0)]." 
Thus we use the collective summation technology by writing 
p = p(M1),         (3) 
where M1  is the sum of the self-protection of the two countries 
M1 = m1
A +m1
B.        (4) 
Here, we assume that p ' > 0  and p '' < 0 throughout. 
 
M
1
 is an international public good. 
 The second risk management instrument is self-insurance. The loss for country i in the bad state is 
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given as 
Li = Li - F(M2 ),        (5) 
where Li  is the baseline loss for country i in that bad state, F(M2 )  is the self-insurance benefit, and 
M2  is the sum of the self-insurance outlays.  
M
2
 is also an international public good. 
2 2 2 .
A BM m m          (6) 
 Self-insurance differs from standard market insurance in that self-insurance benefit function 
F(M2 ) should show diminishing returns or increasing costs. 1>F’>0, F’’≤0. EB make this assumption 
also, and refer glancingly to the role of human capital in providing for self-insurance as a source of 
diminishing returns.  National self-insurance may often involve actions like stockpiling or standby 
production maintenance and these surely will show diminishing returns3.  Declining "productivity" of 
"M2" thus is the first source of a distinction between sovereign self-insurance vs. lesser scale 
decentralized market insurance.  
 A second major difference between self-insurance as provided by an entire country and ordinary 
market insurance is that when a whole nation provides insurance to itself, fair pricing would seem to be 
the standard case and not an outlier just referenced for comparison.  Moreover, it is plausible to assume 
that the nation as a price maker, not as a price taker, incorporates this actuarially fair condition in its 
optimization.  
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2.2. Optimization of each country 
In our formulation of a two country model the expected utility may be rewritten as 
1 01
1 1 2 1 1 2
1
1 ( )
( ) [ ] (1 ( )) [ { ( )}].
( )
p M
W p M U Y m m p M U Y m L F M
p M

            (1)’ 
Expected utility (1)’ is maximized with respect to m1
i  and m2
i  subject to (2), (3), (4), (5), and (6) 
for each country.  This gives (7) as the first order condition (FOC) for self-insurance, and (8) as the FOC 
for self-protection.  
       FOC
{M2 ,C
i }
: 1 0 2(1 ) '( ) 0,
i i
Y Yp U p U F M         (7) 
FOC
{M1,C
i }
: 1 0 1 0 12
2
[ '( )] [ (1 ) ] 0.i i i i i iY Y Y
d
p U U pU p U m U
dM
  
       
   
        (8) 
To begin with, we consider the FOC for self-insurance. Eq. (7) shows the expected marginal 
utility cost of providing m2  i.e. 
[ ppU
Y
1i], equal to the expected marginal utility benefit of providing m2 , 
i.e.
 
(1- p)U
Y
0iF ', evaluated at the solution value of M2. If this necessary condition is rewritten as in (9) 
then its actuarial meaning becomes clear. The RHS there gives the probability weighted marginal 
insurance/benefit receipt under adversity for the last, probability-weighted dollar of premium paid in 
good times  
1 0
2[(1 ) / ] '( ).Y YU U p p F M        (9) 
 If self-insurance is actuarially fair (henceforth simply "fair") as we believe should be the paradigm 
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for an entire country then the concept must be defined as in eq. (10).  
   
 
p = (1- p) p .        (10) 
Inserting eq. (10) into (7), then the optimum simplifies to  
    1 0 2'( ).
i i
Y YU U F M        (11) 
In contrast to the linear market insurance case no equivalence is implied between 
 
U
Y
1i  and 
 
U
Y
0i , with 
significant implications, we shall see for the inferiority vs. normality of insurance. 
Next we investigate the FOC for self-protection (8). Inserting the condition for actuarial fairness 
(10) directly gives: 
1 0 1 0 1
2[ '( )] [ (1 ) ] [( '/ ) ] 0.
i i i i i
Y Y Yp U U pU p U p p m U          (12) 
We can characterize this optimality condition on the provision of self protection saying that there are 
"direct" marginal benefits in the form of the gain in utility p'(U1i - U0i), "direct" marginal costs [pU1iY 
+(1-p) U0iY] and "indirect" benefits,
 
p 'm
2
U
Y
1i / p , comprised of, an unambiguous gain from the decrease 
in insurance premiums paid for the same m2 coverage received.  These indirect benefits stem from the 
lower price implied by lower risk (1-p).  
 
2.3 Cornes-Itaya problem 
If we consider multi-types of pure public goods, a source of instability and imbalance may 
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follow from incentives discovered by Cornes and Itaya (2010). They demonstrate that when two agents 
in a partnership or alliance both could provide two different (pure) public goods, then at a Nash 
equilibrium, it is impossible (unless both agents have identical preference functions) for both agents to 
share in the provision of both goods at an interior solution.  On the other hand, if countries are identical, 
the problem --- and the amount of each good supplied by each country --- becomes indeterminate. This is 
the Cornes-Itaya problem. If the Cornes-Itaya formulation is extended to allow variable costs associated 
with public good provision, this immediately eliminates the indeterminacy associated with interior 
equilibria. 
Observe that unlike the standard constant-average-cost formulation (conventional in the 
voluntary public good model of groups, including Cornes-Itaya) in our formulation of a two country 
model --- i.e. in 
 
W = p( M
1
)U1[Y -m
1
-
1- p( M
1
)
p( M
1
)
m
2
]+ (1- p(M
1
))U 0[Y -m
1
-{L- F( M
2
)}]--- the cost of 
insurance is a non-linear function of 
 
m
1
,m
2
. And this non-linear “technology” for transforming  C
1A  into 
 
M
1
, M
2
 using 
 
m
1
A,m
2
A for country A (same for country B with superscript “B), implies that 2
Am  appears 
in the first order condition (12) along with 
1
1 2, ,
AC M M , so that we may determine 1 2,
i im m  (i=A,B) in a 
two-pure-public-good model.  That is, we can have an interior solution for both types of pure public 
goods even if both countries are not identical. The present formulation, suggested by the alliance 
application, is a specific example which inherently has variable costs and thereby removes 
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indeterminacy. 
 
3. INCOME EFFECTS ON PUBLIC GOODS  
3.1 Income effects ignoring the spillover effect from the other country 
We first investigate the inferiority vs. normality of self-insurance in a one country setting where 
the spillover effect from the other country is ignored. Total differentiation of FOC (7) gives:  
¶m2
i / ¶Y º MY = [ppUYY
1i - (1- p)UYY
0i F '] / D,    (13) 
where D represents the second order condition (SOC). 
SOC
{M2 ,C
i }
: 1 0 0(1 ) ' (1 ) '' 0.i i iYY YY YD p U p F U p U F         (14) 
 From the SOC we know therefore 
 
ppU
YY
1i - (1- p)U
YY
0i F ' < -(1- p)U
Y
0iF ''
 
and  0(1 ) '' 0.iYp U F       (15a) 
Hence the sign of the numerator in Eq. (13) is ambiguous and m2 as self-insurance may be inferior 
depending on the pricing of insurance.  
 Specifically, if the numerator is positive, given the SOC, the sign of Eq. (13) is negative, and m2 
becomes inferior4. Absolute risk aversion R is defined as 
                   
 
R = -U
YY
/U
Y
 or  .YY YU RU    
   (15b)  
If risk aversion is increasing (
 
R
1
> R
0
), then D < 0, and hence the sign of (13) is positive. On the other 
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hand, the sign of (13) becomes negative if risk aversion is decreasing. Thus, if risk aversion is increasing 
(decreasing), m2 is normal (inferior).  And if relative risk aversion is constant, absolute risk aversion will 
be decreasing and hence m2 becomes inferior. Self insurance will prove inferior even if it is fairly priced 
and optimally provided since even optimal and fair self-insurance will not in general equalize incomes or 
marginal utilities across contingencies.  The differential in incomes across contingencies is attributable 
to the declining productivity of self-insurance, as shown in (11), which contrasts with the complete 
coverage and equalization of incomes that results from fairly priced and optimally provided market 
insurance. Thus, the dilemmas implicit in goods-inferiority as they apply to group allocation become 
more salient and serious when a group is composed of "self-insurers". 
 As to the income effect on self-protection, the possibility that it is a normal good cannot be 
completely excluded simply by assuming that absolute risk aversion decreases with wealth. Taking total 
differentiation of FOC (8) gives: 
 
1 0 1 0 1 2
1
'( ) [ (1 ) ] '
,
Y Y YY YY YY
m
p U U pU p U U p
m p
Y E
    

 
      
(16a) 
where E represents the second order condition (SOC). 
 
1 0 1 0 1 0
1 12 2 2
2 2
"( ) 2 '( ) [ (1 ) ]
' '
( 1 ) ( " ' ') 0.
Y Y YY YY
YY Y
E p U U p U U pU p U
p m m p m
U U pp p p
p p p
      
     
    
(16b) 
Unlike self insurance, we cannot completely exclude the possibility of a normal case simply by 
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assuming that absolute risk aversion decreases with wealth. Here if absolute risk aversion is 
increasing/decreasing and (1-p) is initially low/high, m1 will be normal, while if absolute risk aversion is 
decreasing/increasing and (1-p) is low/high, m1 becomes inferior.  
 
3.2 Spillover income effect in a two country model 
         So far we have ignored spillover effects from the other country. Ihori, McGuire, and Nakagawa 
(2011) investigate income effects in a two country framework general equilibrium. Those analytical 
results become complicated and ambiguous. Thus, in order to explain recent burden sharing within 
NATO in this paper we present further analysis of these phenomena by means of examples/simulations. 
Nevertheless, the analysis we believe is quite general.   
         We begin with an intuitive explanation of the spillover-income effect from the partner country. 
Suppose self-protection m1 is normal but self-insurance m2 is inferior for each country considered 
separately. Then if country A’s wealth rises (or economic growth occurs), we would expect 
 
m
1
A  to 
increase, and 
 
m
2
A to decline. However, in a two-country model, we need to consider response of the other 
country B. Now, a decline in 
 
m
2
A  stimulates country B’s provision of
 
m
2
B , which then stimulates
 
m
1
A .  
 The intuition is as follows: when one country A (home) reduces its provision of security 
 
m
2
A  it 
creates a negative externality for its partner country B (foreign), and hence the partner's effective (or 
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full) income 
 
Y B +m
1
A +pm
2
A  declines.  But when the public good is inferior, the partner will react to a 
decrease in its full income by increasing its provision of that public good
 
m
2
B . This generates a positive 
externality for home A by reducing the marginal benefit of raising
 
m
2
A , which then will react by reducing 
its provision 
 
m
2
A  further. Now, this will reduce both the marginal benefit of raising 
 
m
1
A  and the marginal 
cost of raising 
 
m
1
A since consumption in the bad state has become higher due to the increase in 
 
m
2
B . If 
the former effect is larger than the latter effect, 
 
m
1
A  declines. Hence, if its income rises country A may 
reduce 
 
m
1
A  in the two-country framework even if 
 
m
1
A  is normal in a one country setting. 
 Schematically: 
1 1 2
12 2
0
0 ( ) 0
0 if the decline of marginal benefit is large0 0
A
A B A A
AA B
Y
m Y m m
mm m

   
     
     
 
We call this negative spillover effect “the spillover income effect”. Thus, there could be a corner Nash 
equilibrium at which only one of the two countries, (here country B), provides the public good of self-
protection than it would absent an alliance partner in a one country model. Our simulation result in 
Appendix confirms this conjecture. 
 When each country can provide both types of public good5, as explained above both types of 
security can become inferior if absolute risk aversion declines with wealth. And as recognized, for 
example, in Kerschbamer and Puppe (1998) or in Ihori and McGuire (2007, 2010), when a public good 
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is inferior, the Nash equilibrium solution for two countries easily becomes unstable implying a corner 
solution where only one country provides the public good.   However actual data on military spending 
do not seem to support such inferiority. We call this seemingly paradoxical outcome the inferiority 
difficulty. 
 
3.3 Changes in Loss in the Bad State 
Now if loss-in-the-bad-state increases, it raises security spending, and if the loss is positively 
associated with income, then income growth would also likely raise security spending. Thus, if we 
include changes in both income and loss-in-the-bad-state, we should have a better, more realistic, 
explanation of security spending among allies. 
First of all, an increase in  L  itself would raise the demand for self-insurance.  It is easy to show 
that 
 
0
2 (1 ) ' 0.YY
m p U F
L D
 
 

       (17) 
Second, if  L  increases with national income ( L =aY ), it could happen that the overall income effect 
from both changes in  L  and Y combined may become positive even though m2 is an inferior good.  
 
1 0 1 0
2 (1 )(1 ) ' (1 )(1 ) ' .YY YY YY YY
m p U p U F p U p U F
Y D D D
         
  

    (18) 
The first term on the RHS of Eq.(18) represents the effect of income on the provision of self-insurance, 
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which is positive since D < 0. The second term on the RHS denotes the effect of income change upon the 
associated loss-in-the-bad-state --- which in turn changes the provision of self-insurance, and  is negative. 
Here if a  is high, the second term on the RHS of Eq.(18) becomes small. This means that the effect of 
increasing income on the marginal provision of m2 is cancelled and reversed by the effect of increasing 
loss. Thus, increasing income with its associated loss may raise self-insurance, overwhelming the 
negative income effect. 
 
4. NUMERICAL RESULTS6 
 (TABLE 4.1) 
 
4.1 Exploitation hypothesis and burden sharing in NATO 
Olson (1965) and Olson and Zeckhauser (1966) pointed out the so-called exploitation 
hypothesis, whereby large wealthy allies shoulder the defense burdens of smaller allies. Olson and 
Zeckhauser confirmed their ‘exploitation hypothesis’ based on 1964 defense budgets. If the income 
effect is positive, we may theoretically confirm the ‘exploitation hypothesis’. Indeed, Oneal and Diehl 
(1994) --- using pooled regression analysis for 1950-1986 --- argued that Olson’s original emphasis on 
the public nature of the good supplied by the alliance was valid. But while the OZ hypothesis seems to 
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have support in earlier periods of the Cold War, recent changes in military spending do not seem to 
comport with the “exploitation hypothesis.”  
Murdoch and Sandler pointed out that between United States (US) and western European 
countries the difference in military expenditure-as-a-ratio-of-GDP decreased from 1960 to 1979 
(Murdoch and Sandler 1984, p.84). Tables 4.1 (a) and (b) respectively show 5-year average military 
expenditures and national GDP’s of 14 countries that were members of NATO during 1975-2009 
(excluding Iceland).  In the second half of 1970s, the proportionate military expenditure of the US is not 
significantly large compared to smaller countries, e.g. in 1975-1979 the military expenditure of the US 
was 5.0% , while that of Germany was 3.4 % of GDP. In 1980s, the US increased its proportionate 
military expenditure, while smaller countries decreased theirs. In 1990s with the end of Cold War, most 
of the countries in the NATO decreased their military expenditures. The magnitude of decline was 
largest for the US and less so in the smaller countries. Thus, for the US average military expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP declined between 1985-1989 and 1990-1994 by 1.4% while for the smaller countries 
the decline was somewhat less i.e. 1%. During this period of time, the US GDP as a share of all-NATO 
GDP increased from 52.7% to 52.8%. In absolute terms the decrease in the security outlay of US was 
significantly large. Presently we will use our framework to explain the structure of these changes in 
NATO burden sharing. 
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There have been many candidates to explain why the OZ hypothesis failed both after and even 
during the Cold War --- non Nash-Cournot behavior, Lindahl behavior, systematic differences in 
recognition or evaluation of the "threat," inapplicability of a single utility function to represent the 
interests of an entire government or nation etc.  Some studies have argued that the NATO-supplied-good 
was not purely public, especially after 1967. See, for instance, Sandler and Hartley (1995, 2001). These 
authors were skeptical about the plausibility of the exploitation hypothesis in 1970s. They developed a 
joint product model, as an important extension of the pure public good model. The theoretical analysis of 
a joint product model is provided by Cornes and Sandler (1984,1994). They provide comparative statics 
of the joint product model including the income effects, and show, among others, that the 
complementarity/substitutability between the private and public benefits of security expenditure affects 
not only the magnitude of the income effect but also the sign of that effect. 
Our theoretical framework differs from those joint production models in several respects. First, 
defense good inferiority is far more plausible and likely to occur in our model. In the joint product model, 
contribution to the public good is inferior if the private and the public benefits of the contribution are 
strong complements (Cornes and Sandler 1994). In our model, defense good inferiority results from 
decreasing absolute risk aversion. Second, we formalize the uncertainty of the bad event following the 
state-of-the-world approach. The effects of risk aversion and of loss in the bad state on contribution to 
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alliance security can be explicitly investigated in our model. As we show below these factors help to 
explain recent burden sharing in NATO. Thus, our model is complementary with the joint product model, 
rather than a substitute. Our theory developed above, does conform with the history of NATO burden 
sharing as in Olson and Zeckhauser during the Cold War. But at the same time, we also explain the 
failure of Olson and Zeckhauser after the Cold War. 
 
4.2 Specification for simulations 
To highlight several changes in observed security spending in NATO, we report numerical 
simulations of the impact of changes in income and possible loss. We specify the form of utility with the 
constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) function: 
U(C) =
C1-q
(1-q )
,         (19) 
where q(> 0) is the measure of constant relative risk aversion. This function implies that absolute risk 
aversion is decreasing with consumption. As shown in section 3, with CRRA utility the sign of income 
effect on self-insurance, therefore, is negative. 
We also specify the risk reduction function as 7 
p(M1) =
pd M1 +1
pd M1 + (1/ p0 )
.       (20) 
In equation (20), p0  is the baseline probability of the good state when no expenditure is made on self-
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protection, and pd  is a parameter for the marginal risk reduction from an increment of expenditure. This 
marginal risk reduction is given by  
dp
dM1
=
pd
(pd M1 + (1/ p0 ))
2
1
p0
-1
æ
èç
ö
ø÷
,      (21a) 
which is positive but decreasing with M1. Unlike Tullock’s (1967) and Hirshleifer’s (1989) contest 
success functions, equation (20) assumes that self protection is a pure public good and hence the sum of 
the outlays by allies determines the risk of the bad state. Using this functional form, the risk reduction 
function has the following properties: 
p0 £ p(M1)<1 and p '(M1)> 0 for any M1 ³ 0,  and lim
M1®¥
p(M1) =1.     (21b) 
Note that there is no upper bound to the expenditure on self-protection. 
For simplicity, we specify the loss reduction function as a linear function of the sum of 
expenditures by the two allied countries: 
F(M2 ) =fM2,         (22) 
where f  is the degree of loss reduction from one unit of expenditure. Then  1> F ' =f,F '' = 0.   
 
(TABLE 4.2) 
 
Table 4.2 gives the values of parameters chosen for the simulation. For the parameter settings, in 
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a one country framework the income effect on self-insurance is negative, but the effect on self-protection 
is positive.  
 
（TABLE 4.3） 
 
4.3 Numerical simulation of a scenario similar to NATO’s history 
 
Table 4.3 now shows --- in a compressed style --- elements of a scenario with GDP and defense 
outlay changes  similar to NATO’s history  and thus related to the history of changes in burden sharing 
within NATO. We considered a bi-nation, asymmetric configuration where country B’s income is 60% of 
A’s, and the potential loss of B is also 60% of that of A. This reflects the data shown in Table 4.1; in 
1985-1989 the sum of the second to fourth largest GDPs (Germany, UK, and France) is 53% of US GDP, 
and the sum of the second to fifth GDPs (adding Italy) is 67% of the US. 
In 1970s, many empirical studies suggest that compared with small countries the big country 
(US) reduced its security spending, which is inconsistent with the Olson-Zeckhauser exploitation 
hypothesis. Here we explain this as a move from column 1 to column 2 in Table 4.2. This move follows 
from an increase in income while loss in the bad state remained fixed. Row 19 shows that country A 
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reduces its security spending/GDP due to the negative income effects. On the other hand, in 1980s the 
big country raised its security spending by a lot --- which is consistent with the exploitation hypothesis. 
This could be reflected as a move from column 2 to column 3. This move includes both an increase in 
income and an increase in loss in the bad state. A decline in loss reduces the expenditures of a big 
country on self-insurance and self-protection more than those of small country. Yet within the parameters 
(Table 4.2) of this simulation, raising both the loss and together with it the income of one country 
produces minimal effects on welfare in Nash-optimized equilibrium. Still this outcome benefits both the 
richer “partner” (country A) (despite its higher loss), and the poorer partner (country B) as well. The 
correlated increase in loss in country A with the increase in income raises its security outlay and 
generates positive spill-overs into country B. This move from Col 2 to 3 reflects the increase in loss from 
the rising threat posed by the Soviet Union of the 1980’s.  
As shown by the move from column 3 to column 4, we examined a reduction of loss in both 
countries, with income remaining fixed; and found that the decline in loss reduced expenditures of 
country A on both self-insurance and self-protection more than those of country B --- results that directly 
conflict with the exploitation hypothesis. After the Cold War in 1990s the big country reduced security 
spending more than small countries. Here we may suppose that there was a decline in loss for the bad 
state while income remained fixed. It seems reasonable to conjecture that the fall of the Soviet Union 
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reduced the loss in the bad state and caused a reduction in security outlays in the NATO countries8.  
Note that the reduction in self-protection by the big country, decreases the probability of the 
good state, p, and raises the probability of the bad state, 1-p. Row 9 in Table 4.3 also shows how a 
decrease in loss in the bad state leads to an increase in its likelihood. After 9/11 in the 2000’s, the US 
raised its security spending substantially. This change corresponds to a reverse move from column 4 to 
column 3 in Table 4.3, i.e. an increase in loss in the bad state with income remaining fixed.  
Thus, our approach where defense is disaggregated into two components, insurance and 
protection, potentially dominates the single public good OZ model. Our new models of burden sharing 
and the numerical examples used to illustrate them can explain these developments in security spending 
in the real world, and do it better than the traditional OZ model. Since our approach produces a variety 
of cases including multiple equilibria and corner solutions, it could plausibly explain recent changes in 
actual security spending as well.9. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
This paper has investigated two types of security spending available to expected utility 
maximizing agents faced with "costs of emergency", namely self-insurance and self-protection. We 
applied a model of self-insurance and self-protection to groups of two countries where such insurance 
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and protection are public goods.  We demonstrated that since self-insurance is likely to be inferior, self 
protection can also become inferior and hence an inherent potential exists --- due to a spillover income 
effect --- for destabilizing incentives to generate corner outcomes in the provision of these public goods. 
Specifically, we showed that even if the sign of the income effect on self-protection is normal in a one-
country model, it may become negative in a two-country setting due to the spillover income effect, and 
hence with respect to self-protection corner solutions are more likely. When both self insurance and self 
protection become inferior, the big country should provide less security spending than the small country, 
(though this has not been observed yet or recorded). We call this seemingly paradoxical outcome the 
“inferiority difficulty”. To solve it, we considered changes in loss-in-the-bad-state and showed how this 
problem can be avoided. Theoretically, if loss in the bad state increases, it stimulates security spending. 
Thus, if we consider changes in both income and loss in the bad state, we can offer a better and more 
realistic explanation of security spending of countries in an alliance. 
Next, assuming CRRA utility functions, we reported simulation results of effects of a smaller 
loss or greater national income upon Nash equilibria allocations. We showed that the big country A’s 
optimal self-insurance and self-protection increase when both loss in the bad state and income also rise.  
We presented a range of hypothetical scenarios to depict recent developments of burden sharing in 
NATO. Recent data on military expenditures suggested that the exploitation hypothesis may not be 
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relevant to the post Cold War era. No longer is the “exploitation of the great by the small” so crucial as 
in the early days of NATO. It seems reasonable to conjecture that the fall of the Soviet Union reduced 
the loss in the bad state and caused the reduction in security outlays in the countries of NATO. We may 
well explain these changes in security spending. 
 Although true that a 2-player formulation is limited, we conjecture that our model captures the 
essence of multiplayer games. Moreover, the analysis rests on the summation (linear) technology 
applying to both self-protection and self-insurance; and there are many other technologies including 
weakest-link or threshold that could apply to these questions and provide different outcomes. Extending 
all these limitations should be left for future research. 
We do not insist that our explanation is the only one to deal with the observed expiration of OZ’s 
exploitation hypothesis. The joint product model and other factors could explain its decline. But overall, 
our approach where defense is disaggregated into two components, insurance and protection, potentially 
dominates the single public good OZ model. Our simulations and a variety of cases of resource 
allocations implied by our theory --- including negative income effects --- could account for a good share 
of the recent changes in security spending. It is hoped that this paper may have highlighted the 
importance of issues of multiple public goods, instabilities, corner solutions, and conflicts of many-
partner alliances in providing national security. 
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APPENDIX: Some Simulation Results 
We first conducted numerical simulations in which country A’s income increases from 40 to 80, 
while country B’s income remains unchanged at 40. The result of this simulation is presented in Table 
A.1. When Y A =Y B = 40 , there are multiple Nash equilibria, shown in column 1 to column 3. After 
country A’s income exceeds 40, there is a unique Nash equilibrium in which A contributes nothing to 
self-protection. 
The impact of A’s economic growth decreases A’s security expenditure on self insurance, but 
increases B’s expenditure on self insurance. Row 6 shows the self-insurance of country A, and row 8 
shows that of B. Comparing column 2 with column 4, A’s self-insurance decreases with its income 
growth, while B’s self-insurance increases when A’s income rises. The increase in A’s income reduces 
A’s self-insurance, which, in turn, reduces B’s full income and increases B’s self-insurance since 
 
m
2
B  is 
inferior. The increase in A’s income also increases B’s self-protection and finally it, therefore, reduces 
A’s self protection. Thus, self protection becomes inferior in a two country setting. This is due to the 
spillover income effect, (of A upon B) explained in section 3.2. Because the decline in m2A reduces B’s 
full income, the increase in B’s self-insurance that follows reduces A’s marginal benefit of self-protection.  
Row 15 and row 16 show the welfare impact of A’s income growth. Country A’s growth 
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improves the welfare of country A, but reduces that of B. In a sense, therefore, we have an ‘inverse’ 
exploitation hypothesis, that is,  “exploitation of the small by the great” --- just the opposite of Olson and 
Zeckhauser. In other words, when the income effect becomes negative, the standard exploitation 
hypothesis does not hold.  
Next, Table A.2 shows results of a simulation where country A’s loss in the bad state and its 
income increase parametrically ( while B’s loss and income remain constant. Unlike Table A.1, 
Table A.2 shows that at Nash equilibrium (after changes in both income and possible loss) country A’s 
optimal self-insurance as well as its self protection increase.  
To investigate another effect --- specifically of changes in possible loss --- with income fixed in 
an asymmetric economy, we conducted the numerical simulation of Table A.3.  There we consider an 
asymmetric configuration where country B’s income is 60% of A’s income, and the loss for B is also 
60% of that of A. We reduce
 
LA(LB )  from 21(12.6) to 7(4.2). This decline in loss reduces the 
expenditure of rich-country A on both self-insurance and self-protection. Comparing column 7 and 
column 3, we find that a decrease in  L
B  from 6.6 to 4.2 reduces 
 
m
2
B . However, comparing column 3 to 
column 1, a decrease in loss from 12.6 to 6.6 raises B’s self-insurance (from 0.0 to 0.422) --- which 
seems paradoxical. The direct effect of a decrease in loss, as explained above, is to reduce insurance.  
However, we also have an indirect effect:  a decrease in security spending by A reduces the positive 
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spillover into country B.  Since 
 
m
2
B  is inferior, this decline in positive spillover raises
 
m
2
B . When A is 
large and B is small, the spillover income effect from country A may dominate the direct effect, leading 
to the paradoxical increase in
 
m
2
B .  
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conference 2011, Michigan, USA, August 8, 2011, and ANU, Australia, March 24, 2012.  The authors thank 
Robin Boadway, Richard Cornes, Magnus Hoffman, Jun-ichi Itaya, Kai Konrad, Ioana Petrescu, and other 
conference participants for insightful comments on that earlier paper.  The authors wish to acknowledge the 
helpful comments of the editor and two anonymous referees. If there should be any errors these remain the 
sole responsibility of the authors. 
 
1 On the other hand, Oneal and Diehl (1994) argued that Olson’s original emphasis on the public nature of the 
good supplied by the alliance remains valid using pooled regression analysis for 1950-1986. 
2 Our "baseline risk" corresponds to what is sometimes referred to as "background risk" in economics of 
insurance analyses.  Background risk distinguishes "independent" background risk where p(0) is not 
influenced by the value of L(0) as in our model here, versus "non-independent"  background risk where p(0) 
and L(0) are interdependent, and asks how the choice of protection or insurance varies with the independence 
property (See Schlesinger, 2000).  
3 In an example of flood protection and insurance, as greater quantities of consumables are set aside during 
dry years, their costs of preservation and delivery during good years might increase more than proportionately.  
4 Note if self-insurance is fair and therefore (1-p) =  pπ, then the numerator of (13) becomes p(U1YY -U0YY). 
5 Our simple solution to the problem of diminishing returns and distribution of infra marginal costs/gains in a 
public good spillover environment will be to assume a "summation finance aggregator," M = ∑m, in the 
provision of public good, even though p(M), represents a "non-summation consumption aggregator" (e.g. 
p(M) ≠ ∑pi(mi))  Then, importing an idea from contest theory we take primitive preferences as being over 
contributions to insurance or to risk reduction, rather than insurance coverage or risk reduction itself. 
6 To conduct the numerical simulations, we used Mathematica 7.0.0. 
7 Eq(20) can be rewritten as 
 
p( M
1
) = p
0
+ (1- p
0
)
M
1
M
1
+ (1/ p
0
p
d
)
é
ë
ê
ù
û
ú . The RHS can be interpreted as a 
convex combination of unity and a Tullock’s contest success function where the weight of the former is 
 
p
0
 
and that of the latter is 
 
1- p
0
. We can think of a Tullock’s contest with two competitors: one is the alliance of 
countries A and B, the other is an opposing alliance. The effort of the former is 
 
M
1
 and that of the latter is 
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fixed at 
 
(1/ p
0
p
d
). Eq.(18) means that even if the alliance of A and B loses the Tullock’s contest, the alliance 
becomes a good state with probability 
 
p
0
. In this paper, however, the bad state is not necessarily the loss of 
this kind of contest. Thus, we write the loss reduction function as in (18). 
8 If we treat national security as a whole with no disaggregation into self-insurance and self-protection (as in 
the conventional framework of public good provision) a decrease in the threat from an enemy reduces 
contribution (as a % of GDP), where the decline in the percent contribution of the smaller country is greater 
than that of the larger country. This outcome is consistent with the exploitation hypothesis. But we cannot 
explain the change of security outlays in 1990s by using this model. Thus, if the loss in bad state increases, 
the conventional framework of single public good is inadequate. 
9 One could argue that the big country will move first as a Stackelberg-leader. In other calculations (available 
on request) we considered a leader-follower model with country A the leader and B the follower. It turned out 
that those results of simulated NATO burden sharing were less consistent with the actual burden sharing 
history than the results reported here. 
 
REFERENCES 
Cornes, R., and Itaya, J. (2010) " On the Private Provision of Two or More Public Goods," Journal of 
Public Economic Theory, 12(2), 363-385. 
Cornes, R. and T. Sandler (1984) Easy riders, joint production and public goods, Economic Journal 94, 
580-598. 
Cornes, R. and T. Sandler (1994) The comparative static properties of the impure public good model, 
Journal of Public Economics, 54:403-421. 
Ehrlich, I. and G. Becker (1972) Market insurance, self-insurance, and self-protection, Journal of 
Political Economy 80: 623-648. 
Hirshleifer, J. (1989) Conflict and rent-seeking success functions: Ratio vs. difference models of relative 
success, Public Choice 63, 101-112. 
Ihori, T. and M. C. McGuire (2007), Collective risk control and group security: The unexpected 
consequences of differential risk aversion, Journal of Public Economic Theory, 9, 231-263. 
IIhori, T. and M. C. McGuire (2010), National self-insurance and self-protection against adversity: 
Bureaucratic management of security and moral hazard. Economics of Governance, 11, 231-263. 
Ihori, T., M. C. McGuire, and S. Nakagawa (2011), International Security, Insurance, and Protection: 
Failure of the Conventional Model of Alliances, mimeo. 
Kerschbamer, R. and C. Puppe (1998), Voluntary Contributions when the Public Good Is not Necessarily 
Normal, Journal of Economics 68, 175-192.  
Murdoch, J. C. and T. Sandler (1984) Complementarity, free riding, and the military expenditures of 
NATO allies, Journal of Public Economics 25, 83-101. 
Olson, M. and R. Zeckhauser (1966) An Economic Theory of Alliances, Review of Economics and 
Statistics 48, 266-279. 
Oneal, J. R. and P. F. Diehl (1994) The Theory of Collective Action and NATO Defense Burdens: New 
Empirical Tests, Political Research Quarterly 47, 373-396. 
Sandler, T. (1992) Collective Action: The Theory and Application, Ann Arbor: Univ of MI Press 
Sandler, T. (1997) Global Challenges: An approach to environmental, political, and economic problems. 
New York: Cambridge University Press.  
Sandler, T. (2005) Collective versus unilateral responses to terrorism, Public Choice. 
Sandler, T. and Forbes, J. F, (1980) Burden Sharing, Strategy, and the Design of NATO, Economic Inquiry, 
18, 425-44.  
Sandler, T. and K. Hartley (1995), The Economics of Defense, Cambridge UP 
Sandler, T. and K. Hartley (2001), Economics of Alliances: The Lessons for Collective Action, Journal of 
Economic Literature,39, 869-896. 
Sandler, T. and H. Shimizu (2012) NATO Burden Sharing 1999–2010: An Altered Alliance, Foreign Policy 
  
32 
Analysis , forthcoming. 
Schlesinger, H. (2000) The Theory of Insurance Demand, Ch 5 in Dionne ed., Handbook of Insurance, 
Kluwer,. 
Tullock, G. (1967) The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, Western Economic Journal 5, 
224-232. 
  
33 
Table 4.1(a): 5-year average of military expenditures as % of GDPs (based on current prices) 
Country Name 
1975- 
1979 
1980- 
1984 
1985- 
1989 
1990- 
1994 
1995- 
1999 
2000- 
2004 
2005- 
2009 
Belgium 3.2 3.2 2.8 1.9 1.5 1.3 1.2 
Denmark 2.4 2.4 2.0 1.9 1.7 1.5 1.4 
France 3.8 4.0 3.8 3.3 2.9 2.5 2.3 
Germany 3.4 3.3 3.0 2.1 1.6 1.4 1.3 
Greece 5.6 5.3 5.1 3.9 4.1 3.2 2.8 
Italy 2.0 2.1 2.3 2.0 1.9 2.0 1.6 
Luxembourg 0.9 1.0 1.0 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.5 
Netherlands 3.1 3.0 2.8 2.3 1.8 1.5 1.5 
Norway 2.9 2.7 2.9 2.8 2.2 1.9 1.5 
Portugal 3.4 2.9 2.7 2.3 2.1 1.7 1.5 
Turkey 4.4 4.0 3.3 2.8 3.2 3.2 2.0 
United Kingdom 4.9 5.2 4.5 3.7 2.7 2.3 2.5 
Canada 1.9 2.0 2.1 1.8 1.3 1.2 1.3 
United States 5.0 5.6 6.0 4.6 3.3 3.4 4.5 
Sources: North Atlantic Treaty Organization (1996, 2000, 2011) “Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO 
defense” Table 3, < http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/index.htm >  
 
Table 4.1(b): 5-year average of national GDP as % of the total GDP of 14 member countries of NATO 
(based on constant 2000 US$) 
Country Name 
1975- 
1979 
1980- 
1984 
1985- 
1989 
1990- 
1994 
1995- 
1999 
2000- 
2004 
2005- 
2009 
Belgium 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3 
Denmark 1.1 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 
France 9.0 8.6 8.1 8.0 7.6 7.4 7.2 
Germany 12.9 12.2 11.3 11.8 11.1 10.3 9.9 
Greece 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 
Italy 7.5 7.3 7.0 6.9 6.4 6.1 5.7 
Luxembourg 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Netherlands 2.4 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 
Norway 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0 0.9 1.0 
Portugal 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 
Turkey 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.8 
United Kingdom 9.7 8.7 8.7 8.3 8.3 8.4 8.4 
Canada 4.3 4.1 4.1 3.9 4.0 4.1 4.2 
United States 47.7 50.7 52.7 52.8 54.4 55.5 56.1 
Sources: The World Bank (2011) “World Development Indicators & Global Development Finance,” 15 December, 2011, < 
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators > 
 
  
34 
Table 4.2: Parameter values 
q  f   L   
p
0
 
 
p
d
 
0.9 0.9 10 0.25 1 
 
Table 4.3 Numerical simulations corresponding to burden sharing in NATO 
 1 2 3 4 
1   Y
A  40 50 60 60 
2   Y
B  24 30 36 36 
3   L
A  10 10 15 10 
4   L
B  6 6 9 6 
5  
 
m
1
A  
1.316  1.348  2.690  1.380  
6  
 
m
2
A  
2.569  2.098  5.234  1.619  
7  
 
m
1
B  
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
8  
 
m
2
B  
0.505  0.392  0.192  0.280  
9  
 
p( M
1
)  
0.436  0.439  0.552  0.442  
10 
 
F( M
2
)  2.767  2.241  4.884  1.709  
11  C
1A  35.356  45.971  53.055  56.580  
12  C
0 A 31.450  40.892  47.193  50.329  
13  C
1B  23.346  29.500  35.844  35.647  
14  C
0B  20.767  26.241  31.884  31.709  
15  W
A  14.190  14.568  14.798  14.874  
16  W
B  13.613  13.936  14.229  14.203  
17 
 
Y A +m
1
B +pm
2
B 
40.654  50.500  60.156  60.353  
18 
 
Y B +m
1
A +pm
2
A 
28.644  34.029  42.945  39.420  
19 
 
(m
1
A +pm
2
A) / Y A 
11.609% 8.058% 11.576% 5.700% 
20 
 
(m
1
B +pm
2
B ) / Y B 
2.726% 1.667% 0.434% 0.981% 
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Table A.1: Impact on Nash equilibrium of increase in A’s income in two-country model  
      1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1   Y
A  40 40 40 50 60 70 80 
2   Y
B  40 40 40 40 40 40 40 
3  L
A  10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
4  L
B  10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
5  
 
m
1
A  0.485  0.000  0.981  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
6  
 
m
2
A  1.786  1.750  1.831  1.177  0.520  0.000  0.000  
7  
 
m
1
B  0.485  0.981  0.000  1.137  1.312  1.447  1.447  
8  
 
m
2
B  1.786  1.831  1.750  2.163  2.560  2.884  2.884  
9  
 
p( M
1
)  0.396  0.398  0.398  0.416  0.435  0.449  0.449  
10  
 
F( M
2
)  3.216  3.223  3.223  3.006  2.772  2.596  2.596  
11   C
1A  36.795  37.349  36.247  48.347  59.326  70.000  80.000  
12  C
0 A 32.730  33.223  32.242  43.006  52.772  62.596  72.596  
13  C
1B  36.795  36.247  37.349  35.827  35.366  35.017  35.017  
14  C
0B  32.730  32.242  33.223  31.869  31.459  31.149  31.149  
15  W
A  14.240  14.262  14.219  14.638  14.944  15.200  15.417  
16  W
B  14.240  14.219  14.262  14.206  14.190  14.179  14.179  
17 
 
Y A +m
1
B +pm
2
B 43.205  43.753  42.651  54.173  64.634  74.983  84.983  
18  
Y B +m
1
A +pm
2
A 43.205  42.651  43.753  41.653  40.674  40.000  40.000  
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Table A.2: Impact of increasing income combined with loss in the bad state: two-country model 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1   Y
A  40 40 40 50 60 70 80 
2   Y
B  40 40 40 40 40 40 40 
3   L
A  10 10 10 15 20 25 30 
4   L
B  10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
5  
 
m
1
A  0.485  0.000  0.981  2.704  3.819  4.777  5.643  
6  
 
m
2
A  1.786  1.750  1.831  5.956  9.488  13.065  16.736  
7  
 
m
1
B  0.485  0.981  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
8  
 
m
2
B  1.786  1.831  1.750  0.136  0.000  0.000  0.000  
9  
 
p( M
1
)  0.396  0.398  0.398  0.552  0.616  0.658  0.689  
10 
 
F( M
2
)  3.216  3.223  3.223  5.483  8.539  11.759  15.063  
11  C
1A  36.795  37.349  36.247  42.472  50.274  58.438  66.799  
12  C
0 A 32.730  33.223  32.242  37.779  44.720  51.982  59.419  
13  C
1B  36.795  36.247  37.349  39.890  40.000  40.000  40.000  
14  C
0B  32.730  32.242  33.223  35.483  38.539  41.759  45.063  
15  W
A  14.240  14.262  14.219  14.472  14.730  14.960  15.167  
16  W
B  14.240  14.219  14.262  14.382  14.441  14.483  14.515  
17 
 
Y A +m
1
B +pm
2
B 43.205  43.753  42.651  50.110  60.000  70.000  80.000  
18 
 
Y B +m
1
A +pm
2
A 43.205  42.651  43.753  47.528  49.726  51.562  53.201  
 
  
37 
Table A.3: Asymmetric two-country model: impact of a smaller loss in the bad state 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1   Y
A  50 50 50 50 50 50 50 
2   Y
B  30 30 30 30 30 30 30 
3   L
A  21 16 11 10 9 8 7 
4   L
B  12.6 9.6 6.6 6 5.4 4.8 4.2 
5  
 
m
1
A  4.022  2.939  1.623  1.348  1.068  0.781  0.483  
6  
 
m
2
A  11.123  6.781  2.751  2.098  1.504  0.973  0.514  
7  
 
m
1
B  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
8  
 
m
2
B  0.000  0.116  0.422  0.392  0.334  0.254  0.157  
9  
 
p( M
1
)  0.626  0.568  0.466  0.439  0.408  0.372  0.331  
10 
 
F( M
2
)  10.011  6.207  2.856  2.241  1.654  1.105  0.604  
11  C
1A  39.334  41.897  45.230  45.971  46.751  47.580  48.476  
12  C
0 A 34.988  37.268  40.234  40.892  41.586  42.324  43.121  
13  C
1B  30.000  29.912  29.517  29.500  29.515  29.571  29.683  
14  C
0B  27.411  26.607  26.256  26.241  26.254  26.305  26.404  
15  W
A  14.374  14.455  14.549  14.568  14.587  14.607  14.627  
16  W
B  14.004  13.976  13.941  13.936  13.932  13.928  13.927  
17 
 
Y A +m
1
B +pm
2
B 50.000  50.088  50.483  50.500  50.485  50.429  50.317  
18 
 
Y B +m
1
A +pm
2
A 40.666  38.103  34.770  34.029  33.249  32.420  31.524  
 
  
 
